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THE KOSOVAR DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
I. INTRODUCTION
On February 17, 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from its
mother-state, Serbia.' Most western governments were quick to recognize
Kosovo as a new state, despite strong Serbian protest and the potential
precedential dangers that such recognized separatism represents for minority
movements across the planet. The Kosovar separation from Serbia is unique
in the history of international relations: it represents a secession, which is
heavily discouraged under traditional international law; it was peaceful, which
is typically not the case in state break-ups; and it was politically supported by
the West, which is traditionally critical of separatist movements as they
undermine state borders and world stability.
What is thus so unique and special about Kosovo that can explain its
success in achieving full independence so quickly and so relatively easily?
Was Kosovo justified in unilaterally seceding from Serbia because its people
had a right to self-determination? Does Kosovo fulfill the relevant criteria of
statehood? What does its early recognition by many western states imply?
Are there other legal theories that can justify the Kosovar separation from
Serbia? Were there other viable options for Kosovo, short of full
independence, that could have presented a better solution legally and
politically?
In order to answer these complicated questions, this Article will examine
in Part II the historic and political relationship between Kosovo and Serbia.
This Article will, in Part III, focus on the international legal issues at stake,
including state secession, statehood, and state recognition. Part IV will then
apply the theories of secession, statehood, and state recognition to the Kosovar
situation. Part V will discuss, and debunk, the relevant legal theories
purporting to justify the Kosovar independence. Part V will also discuss some
important political and legal issues that plague Kosovo in its near future as a
new state. Finally, Part VI will conclude that other solutions besides
independence could have provided more stability for Kosovo while respecting
Serbian territorial integrity and avoiding encouragement to other separatist
groups operating throughout the world.
' Kosovo Declares Independencefrom Serbia, MSNBC, Feb. 18,2008, http://www.msnbc.
msn.com/id/23203607.
2 Serbia Steps Up Anti-Kosovo Pressure, AUSTIN NEws, Feb. 8, 2008, http://www.nbcau
stin.com/Global/story.asp?s=7889772.
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I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON Kosovo
Kosovo has a peculiar relationship with Serbia. It is the heart of the early
Serbian civilization and empire, as well as the site of numerous Serbian
monasteries and other religious sites, which causes it to have particular
symbolic value to the Serbs in general. On the other hand, it is poor,
undeveloped, and predominantly inhabited by ethnic Albanians.4 This paradox
begs the question of why the Serbs wish to hold on to Kosovo with such fierce
passion. In order to address this issue, this Article will discuss the history of
Kosovo and its relationship with Serbia, as well as its significance to Serbia
today.
A. History of Kosovo and Its Relationship with Serbia
Kosovo had been an autonomous province of Serbia, one of the six
republics within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY).5 When
the SFRY dissolved in the early 1990s, Kosovo remained a part of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), then made up of Serbia and Montenegro,6 and
when Montenegro broke away from the latter, Kosovo remained a part of the
sole Serbian state.7
Until the late 1980s, Kosovo had the status of an autonomous province
within the SFRY and exercised important regional self-governance functions.
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Final Status for Kosovo, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 3, 6 (2005).
4 Viola Trebicka, Lessonsfrom the Kosovo Status Talks: On Humanitarian Intervention and
Self-Determination, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 255, 255 (2007) (noting that Kosovo has been
underdeveloped economically); Zejnullah Gruda, Some Key Principles for a Lasting Solution
of the Status of Kosova: Uti Possidetis, the Ethnic Principle, and Self-Determination, 80 CHL-
KENT L. REv. 353, 389 (2005) (noting that the ethnically predominant population of Kosovo is
Albanian by all accounts).
' Bartram S. Brown, Human Rights, Sovereignty, and the Final Status ofKosovo, 80 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 235, 238 (2005).
6 See id. at 238-40 (discussing Serbia's retained control of Kosovo despite the breakup of
the SFRY).
7 See id.
8 The 1974 SFRY Constitution granted Kosovo the status ofan autonomous province within
the country's federal structure. Gruda, supra note 4, at 387. Under the terms of the 1974
Constitution, Kosovo had the following rights: the right to adopt and change its constitution; the
right to adopt laws; the right to exercise constitutional judicial functions and to have a
constitutional court; judicial autonomy and the right to a Supreme Court; the right to decide on
changes of its territory; the right to ratify treaties that were concluded with foreign states and
international bodies; the right to have independent organs and ministries within the local
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More importantly, its predominantly ethnic Albanian population enjoyed
multiple rights, such as the right to education in the Albanian language, the
right to Albanian language media, and the right to celebrate cultural holidays
and to generally preserve its ethnic structure and belonging.9 However, in
response to ethnic Albanian uprising movements throughout Kosovo, staged
by guerilla-like paramilitary groups, the Serbian leadership undertook
draconian measures in the late 1980s to curb the upheaval.' Thus, Kosovo's
autonomous province status was removed, and the Albanian population was
deprived of important civil and political rights."
In 1999, when the former Serbian President Slobodan Milogevid engaged
in brutal tactics of oppressionl 2 -once again in response to ethnic upheavals
in Kosovo staged by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a separatist
movement operating in Kosovo' 3-the international community responded
with force.'4 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries launched
a series of air strikes on the territory of Serbia, which ultimately forced
Milogevid to sign a peace agreement with the Kosovars at Rambouillet, France
in June 1999." Under the terms of the Rambouillet Peace Agreement and
government. Id.
9 See Perritt, supra note 3, at 7 (noting that Kosovar Albanians were allowed to open an
Albanian-language university in Pristina in 1969, and that the institutional changes under
the 1974 SFRY Constitution resulted "in the growing Albanization of educational, political, and
legal institutions"); see also Gruda, supra note 4, at 387 (noting the various rights enumerated
in the Constitution of 1974).
'0 See Perritt, supra note 3, at 8 (describing the measures undertaken by Slobodan Milogevi6
beginning in 1989 and escalating in a campaign of ethnic cleansing by the later part of the 1990s
to curb the Albanian upheaval).
" See Brown, supra note 5, at 263 (noting that amendments to Serbia's constitution in 1989
and 1990 negated the Kosovar autonomy).
12 See Perritt, supra note 3, at 8 (describing the Serbian campaign of ethnic cleansing in
Kosovo, accompanied by massive violence against the Kosovar Albanians by Serbian
paramilitary, military, and police forces).
"3 See Paul R. Williams, Earned Sovereignty: The Road to Resolving the Conflict Over
Kosovo's Final Status, 31 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 387, 397 (2003) (noting that as a result of
Serbian oppression, "some elements of the Kosovar Albanian population formed the Kosovo
Liberation Army [(KLA)], which murdered members of the Serbian police and military forces
and perceived Kosovar Albanian collaborators"); see also Perritt, supra note 3, at 8 (noting that
the KLA began attacking Serbian police and military facilities in Kosovo).
4 Perritt, supra note 3, at 8 (indicating that NATO began its bombing campaign "aimed at
ending ethnic cleansing and protecting human rights in Kosovo"); see also IAIN KING & WHrr
MASON, PEACE AT ANY PRICE: How THE WORLD FAILED Kosovo 43-45 (2006) (describing the
events leading up to the NATO air strikes in the former Yugoslavia).
" See Enver Hasani, Self-Determination Under the Terms of the 2002 Union Agreement
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subsequently United Nations Resolution 1244, the United Nations Mission in
Kosovo (UNMIK), a United Nations provisional authority, was to administer
Kosovo; its safety was to be guarded by a NATO-led military force, KFOR;
and subsequent negotiations to decide the true fate of the province were to take
place in the near future.' 6
Once Milogevi6 stepped down as Serbia's president and leader, the Serbian
outlook and its position toward the West changed. 7 Under the Milogevid rule,
Serbia largely ignored the West and leaned on its historical ally, Russia, for
support. After Milogevi6 was ousted from power, Serbia turned toward the
West. It became clear that in order to join western Europe-and possibly
become a member of the European Union (EU)--Serbia had to sacrifice
Kosovo, or to at least refrain from using force in order to prevent it from
breaking off.'8 The relevant players, including the Serbian leadership, the
Kosovar representatives, and UN and EU representatives, negotiated several
times, but because of strong differences about the future of Kosovo, they were
never able to reach consensus. 9 In fact, Serbia, while pragmatically
Between Serbia and Montenegro: Tracing the Origins ofKosovo 's Self-Determination, 80 CM.-
KENT L. REV. 305, 320 (2005) (noting that the refusal of Serbia to agree to the Rambouillet
Accords caused the NATO bombing campaign); see also Brown, supra note 5, at 240 (discussing
NATO's bombing campaign "to compel the Milo~evid regime to stop the atrocities in Kosovo").
16 See Rambouillet Accords: Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo,
U.N. Doc. S/1 999/648 (June 7, 1999), available athttp://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvo
_rambouillettext.html. Moreover, Security Council Resolution 1244 directly references the
Rambouillet Accords for the purpose of determining Kosovo's future status. S.C. Res. 1244,
11 (e), UN Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999) (June 10, 1999) [hereinafter Resolution 1244]. Thus,
Resolution 1244 represents the legal foundation upon which "the civilian and military branches
of the international administration in Kosovo are based." Hasani, supra note 15, at 323; see also
Gruda, supra note 4, at 356 (noting that under Resolution 1244, Kosovo was administered by
UNMIK). For a detailed discussion of the UN administrative regime over Kosovo under the
terms of the Rambouillet Accords, see Hasani, supra note 15, at 323-25.
"7 Williams, supra note 13, at 415 (describing the political changes in Serbia as a result of
Milogevi6's removal from office).
" For example, during a recent trip to Serbia, in March 2008, 1 witnessed apeaceful political
protest on the streets of Novi Sad, the capital of the northern province of Vojvodina, where
protesters were carrying banners with signs reading: "We have a right to the European future"
and "Don't let Kosovo slow us down." This demonstrates that a portion of the Serbian
population seems aware of the necessity of letting go of Kosovo in order to have access into
Europe.
' See Trebicka, supra note 4, at 256-57 (describing the so-called status talks on the future
of Kosovo and the fact that a "brokered political agreement... has proven much more elusive
than was first thought").
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recognizing the need to accommodate Western demands," maintained its
position that Kosovo remain a territorial part of Serbia with strong regional
autonomy. 21  Kosovo, on the other hand, insisted that it deserved
independence.22
On February 17, 2008, backed by powerful countries like the United States,
the United Kingdom, and France, the Kosovar Parliament voted for a
declaration of independence.23 In the few days following the Kosovar
declaration of independence, the United States, as well as about twenty EU
countries, formally recognized Kosovo as a new state.24
B. Kosovo's Importance to Serbia Today
Kosovo is the cradle of the great Serbian medieval empire.25 It holds
tremendous symbolic value to the Serbs.26 It is in Kosovo that Slobodan
Milogevi6 infamously called in the late 1980s for the "defence of the sacred
rights of the Serbs, 27 and victoriously proclaimed before thousands of angry
20 Timothy Garton Ash, This Dependent Independence Is the Least Worst Solution for
Kosovo, GUARDIAN, Feb. 21, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/21/kosovo
(comparing the loss of Kosovo for Serbia to a loss of a "gangrenous arm" and concluding that
this is a "precondition for recovery").
21 Ban Ki-moon Urges Restraint by All Sides after Kosovo Declares Independence, UN
NEWS CENTRE, Feb. 18,2008, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=25659&Cr-K
ososo&Crl. In fact, the day after the Kosovar declaration of independence, the Serbian
President, Boris Tadic, appealed to the UN Security Council to declare Kosovo's "unilateral and
illegal" declaration of independence "null and void" because Kosovo's separation violates
Resolution 1244 which reaffirms Serbia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Id.
22 See Trebicka, supra note 4, at 255 (observing that the Kosovar Albanians have demanded
their right to self-determination, which would lead to secession).
23 Serbia Steps Up Anti-Kosovo Pressure, supra note 2.
24 For example, as of February 18,2008, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and
Germany had all expressed support for the new state of Kosovo. Note however, that several
states expressed their opposition to the Kosovar independence, including Spain, Russia, China,
Indonesia, and Sri Lanka. Nicholas Kulish & C.J. Chivers, U.S. andMuch ofEurope Recognize
Kosovo, Which Also Draws Expected Rejection, N.Y. TIMES, Late Ed., Feb. 19, 2008, at A10.
25 See Perritt, supra note 3, at 6 (noting that Serbs have traditionally "viewed Kosovo as an
historic part of Serbian land ... since the ninth century").
26 See id. (noting that Serbs have viewed Kosovo as a "historic part of Serbian land, at least
since the ninth century").
27 NOELMALCOLM, Kosovo: A SHORT HISTORY 341-42 (1998). In fact, Milogevi6 used the
political and civil unrest in Kosovo as a political platform that helped him rise to the presidency
of the Serbian communist party in late 1987. Williams, supra note 13, at 395-96.
2009]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Kosovar Serbs, "No one should dare to beat you!" 28 It is a symbol of Serbian
civilization and culture,29 a place as sacred as Jerusalem is to the Jews and to
Christians, and as Mecca is to the Muslims.
Kosovo today, however, can only hold symbolic historical value for Serbia.
The population is predominantly ethnic Albanian," with the remaining Serbian
population living isolated in the northern part of Kosovo 3-which is heavily
guarded by UN, NATO, and EU troops-as well as in Serbian enclaves found
in the southern part of Kosovo.32 Moreover, Kosovo remains extremely poor:
the unemployment rate hovers at more than fifty percent overall, more than
seventy percent for youth;33 the economy remains the poorest in Europe
outside the former Soviet Union;34 and the average monthly salary does not
exceed $250.31 One in six Albanians lives in poverty.36 In addition, Kosovo
28 KING & MASON, supra note 14, at 36. In the same speech, Milogevid also reassured the
Kosovar Serbs that Belgrade would protect their rights:
You should stay here, both for your ancestors and your descendants... But
I do not suggest you stay here suffering and enduring a situation with which
you are not satisfied. On the contrary! It should be changed, together with all
progressive people here, in Serbia and in Yugoslavia... Yugoslavia does not
exist without Kosovo! Yugoslavia would disintegrate without Kosovo!
Yugoslavia and Serbia are not going to give up Kosovo.
Id.
29 See Perritt, supra note 3, at 6 (noting that Kosovo was "the heart of'Old Serbia,' where
the Serbian Orthodox Church, acting through monasteries still standing in Kosovo, organized
Serb and Christian resistance to the spread of Islam under Ottoman domination").
30 See Gruda, supra note 4, at 389-90 (describing the disagreement over the total number
of ethnic Albanians living in Kosovo versus the ethnic Serbs living there, but concluding that
"[b]y any account, the dominant ethnic group in Kosovo is Albanian").
"' Trebicka, supra note 4, at 258 (noting that northern Kosovo is Serb-dominated).
32 Anes Alic & Igor Jovanovic, Kosovo: Worst Still to Come, ISN, Mar. 18, 2008, http://
www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/DetailU?id=54188&lng=en. In fact, sixty-
five percent of the Serbs remaining in Kosovo live south of the Ibar river, in Serbian enclaves
surrounded by Kosovar Albanian villages. Id.
" See also Kulish & Chivers, supra note 24 (observing that the average unemployment rate
in Kosovo is around sixty percent but noting that varying estimates place the figure has high as
seventy percent); Daa Fasdnik, The Labour Market and Youth Unemployment in Kosovo 7-9
(Dec. 2007) (unpublished diploma paper, University of Ljubljana), http://www.cek.ef.uni-lj.si/
u-diplomefarcnik3120.pdf(estimating unemployment rates for youth aged fifteen to twenty-four
years old is seventy percent and the figure for teens is approximately eighty percent).
34 KING & MASON, supra note 14, at 17.
" Kulish & Chivers, supra note 24. The official GDP per capita in Euros was at 1,150 per
year as of November-December 2007, and there were 331,056 registered job-seekers on the
market as of March 2007. FATON BISLIM1 ETAL., UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME,
EARLY WARNING REPORT Kosovo: REPORT No. 19, at 6 (2008), http://www.kosovo.undp.org;
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remains socially and culturally underdeveloped. Modes of traditional lifestyle
are still respected throughout its villages, and the justice system, until recent
UN-imposed reforms, reflected a notion of medieval eye-for-an-eye justice.37
Only a small number of Serbs-mostly those left without other viable
options-are interested in living in Kosovo.3"
Under such dire circumstances, one must wonder why Serbia cares so much
about Kosovo. If the Serbian claim to Kosovo is purely symbolic or historic,
does this somehow justify the Kosovar decision to separate from Serbia by
negating the valid legal basis upon which Serbia could hold on to this disputed
province? In order to address this important question, in Part III, this Article
will turn to international law as a guide to shed light on the complexity of this
separation.
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES AT STAKE
Three international law theories are pertinent to the issue of the Kosovar
separation from Serbia: secession, statehood, and recognition. In other words,
does Kosovo have an international legal right to secede from Serbia? If so,
does it satisfy the relevant requisites of statehood? Finally, does recognition
by Kosovo as a new state (or its absence) impact the place of Kosovo on the
global scene?
A. Secession
Secession under international law refers to separation of a portion of an
existing state, whereby the separating entity either seeks to become a new state
or to join another state, and the original state remains in existence without the
separating territory.39 Successful secessions around the globe have been rare,4"
see also Trebicka, supra note 4, at 255 (noting that Kosovo suffers from severe economic and
financial uncertainty, causing unemployment and a lack of foreign investment).
36 KING & MASON, supra note 14, at 17.
" See id. at 23 (noting that "an Al Capone-like combination of violence and corruption
continues to colour public life").
31 On a recent trip to Serbia, I heard the following statement about the Serbs' attitude toward
Kosovo: Serbs will do just about anything for Kosovo except go live there!
39 JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAwNORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEM-
ORIENTED APPROACH 112 (2d ed. 2006).
o Id. (describing the few successful secessions in international law, which include the
secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971, of Eritrea from Ethiopia in 1993, and of the
three Baltic States from the former Soviet Union in 1990).
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because secession seems inherently at odds with the principles of state
sovereignty and territorial integrity,4 which have been core values of
international law for centuries.42
The most relevant legal issue pertaining to secession is under what
circumstances a minority group seeking to separate from its mother country
has the legal right to do so. The legal right for a "people' ' 3 or a minority group
to attain a certain degree of autonomy from its sovereign has been referred to
as "self-determination" in international law." The principle of self-
determination is embodied in multiple international treaties and conventions.45
41 See Michael P. Scharf, Earned Sovereignty: Juridical Underpinnings, 31 DENy. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 373, 373 (2003) (noting that a determinative issue in international law has been
reconciling the principle of self-determination with the inviolability of state borders). But see
Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A TerritorialInterpretation, 16 YALE J. INT'L
L. 177 passim (199 1) (arguing that secessionist claims involve disputed claims to territory rather
than an incompatibility with territorial integrity).
42 George A. Critchlow, Stopping Genocide Through International Agreement When the
Security Council Fails to Act, 40 GEO. J. INT'L L. 311, 311-12 (2009) (identifying state
sovereignty as a "core international law value[ ]"); Siobhan Wills, Military Interventions on
Behalf of Vulnerable Populations: The Legal Responsibilities of States and International
Organizations Engaged in Peace Support Operations, 9 J. CONFLICT & SECURrY L. 387, 391
(2004) ("[S]tate sovereignty remains a core principle of international law ... ").
43 Although the term "people" is ambiguous and vague under international law, it typically
refers to "people who live within the same state ... or people organized into a state." Gruda,
supra note 4, at 367. Thus, people is a "legal rather than natural category." Id. Moreover, the
term people has been purposely left undefined in international law because if the right to self-
determination were to be applied broadly to all conceivable groups, this could destabilize states
and cause peace and security problems. Brown, supra note 5, at 249.
'4 The principle of self-determination was first elevated to the international plane by
President Woodrow Wilson, who included it in his infamous Fourteen Points. See Scharf, supra
note 41, at 378. For a full discussion of the principle of self-determination, see Gruda, supra
note 4, at 369-82.
4' The term "self-determination" stems from Article 1 of the United Nations Charter, which
speaks of the "principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples." U.N. Charter art. 1,
para. 2. Subsequent declarations voted on by the U.N. General Assembly also refer to the term
"self-determination." See, e.g., Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514(XV), 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1514(XV) (Dec. 14,1960)
("All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.");
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625(XXV),
at 124 U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625(XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970)
("The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with
an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a
people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people.").
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Moreover, the International Court of Justice has also dealt with the issue of
self-determination, and has ruled in a series of cases that the principle has
"crystallized into a rule of customary international law," binding on all states.46
* Under the principle of self-determination, groups with a common identity
and link to a defined territory are allowed to determine their political future in
a democratic fashion.47 Self-determination of such groups can be effectuated
in different ways: through self-government, autonomy, free association, or, in
extreme cases, independence. 48 For a group to be entitled to exercise its
collective right to self-determination, it must qualify as a people.4 9
Traditionally, a two-part test has been applied to determine when a group
qualifies as a people." First, the test looks to objective elements of the group
to determine the extent to which its members "share a common racial
background, ethnicity, language, religion, history and cultural heritage," as
well as the "territorial integrity of the area the group is claiming."51 Second,
the test looks to subjective elements to examine "the extent to which
individuals within the group self-consciously perceive themselves collectively
as a distinct 'people' "and "the degree to which the group can form a viable
political entity."52
Once the determination has been made that a specific group qualifies as a
people and thus has the right to self-determination, the relevant inquiry, for
purposes of secession, becomes whether the right to self-determination creates
a right to secession and independence. In other words, as mentioned above,
the right to self-determination can take different forms, such as autonomy, self-
government, or free association, that are less intrusive on state sovereignty
than secession. 3  Understandably, the international community views
46 Scharf, supra note 41, at 378; see East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 102-06
(June 30); Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 566-67 (Dec. 22); Western
Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 31-33 (Oct. 16); Legal Consequences for States of the
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (S.W. Aft.) Notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 31-32 (June 21).
41 Scharf, supra note 41, at 379.
48 Id.
49 Id.
" Id. Note, however, that the term people has been purposely left undefined under
international law and that the tests seeking to determine when a group qualifies as a people have
been flexibly applied. See supra note 43.
"' Scharf, supra note 41, at 379.
52 Id.
53 See id.
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secession with suspicion,54 and traditionally, the right to independence or
secession as a mode of self-determination has only applied to people under
colonial domination or some kind of oppression.5" However, modem-day
international law has come to embrace the right of non-colonial people to
secede from an existing state "when the group is collectively denied civil and
political rights and subject to egregious abuses. 56 This right has become
known as the "remedial" right to secession, and has its origin in the
infamous 1920 Aaland Islands case.
5 7
The Aaland Islands were a small island nation situated between Finland and
Sweden, belonging to the former and seeking to reunite with the latter.58 In
fact, the Aalanders claimed that they were ethnically Swedish, and that they
wished to break off from Finland and become a part of Sweden.59 In an
advisory opinion, the second Commission ofRapporteurs, operating within the
auspices of the League of Nations, held that this issue was properly of
international, not domestic, jurisdiction, and that the Aalanders had a right to
a cultural autonomy, which had to be exercised within Finland.6° Only if
"4 Id. at 380 (noting that secession is "synonymous with the dismemberment of states").
Note the 1970 statement by then UN Secretary-General U. Thant:
[A]s far as the question of secession of a particular section of a Member State
is concerned, the United Nation's attitude is unequivocable. As an
international organization, the United Nations has never accepted and does
not accept and I do not believe it will ever accept the principle of secession
of a part of its Member State.
Secretary-General's Press Conference, 7 U.N. MONTHLY CHRON. No. 2, at 36 (Feb. 1970); see
also Scharf, supra note 41, at 380.
" Scharf, supra note 41, at 380. Note that under this view, the independence of a colony
was not considered a secession because that term referred only to the "separation from a State
of a portion of its domestic territory." Id. Moreover, the international community has also leaned
on the theory of "salt-water colonialism," under which self-determination only applied to lands
separated from the metropolitan mother-state by oceans or seas. Id.
56 Id. at 381.
57 Id.
" DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 39, at 118-19.
59 Id. at 119.
6 Report Presented by the Commission of Rapporteurs on the Aaland Islands Question,
League of Nations Doc. B7.21.68.106 (1921) [hereinafter Aaland Islands Report]. The League
of Nations created an International Committee of Jurists to determine whether the League of
Nations had jurisdiction over this issue, and the Committee's report generally held that the
League of Nations had such jurisdiction over this issue. Report of the int'l Comm. ofJurists on
the Legal Aspects of the Aaland Islands Question, League of Nations Official Journal, Special
Supp. No. 3, at 3-14 (1920). Then, the League of Nations appointed a Commission of
Rapporteurs to recommend a solution to the Aaland Islands problem, and the Rapporteurs report
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Finland disrespected their ethnic and cultural autonomy would the Aalanders'
right to separate from Finland be triggered.6"
Similarly, the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States strikes a
balance between the right to self-determination and territorial integrity by
conditioning the right of non-colonial people to separate from an existing state
on the denial of the right to a democratic self-government by the mother-
state.62 A similar clause was inserted in the 1993 Vienna Declaration of the
World Conference on Human Rights, accepted by all UN member states.63
Other UN documents have also referred to the right to remedial secession, such
as the 1993 Report of the Rapporteur to the UN Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on Possible Ways
and Means of Facilitating the Peaceful and Constructive Solution of Problems
held that
[t]he separation of a minority from the State of which it forms a part and its
incorporation in another State can only be considered as an altogether
exceptional solution, a last resort when the State lacks either the will or the
power to enact and apply just and effective guarantees.
Aalands Islands Report, supra.
6 Aaland Islands Report, supra note 60 (holding that "in the event that Finland... refused
to grant the Aaland population the guarantees which we have just detailed... [t]he interests of
the Aalanders . . . would then force us to advise the separation of the islands from
Finland .... ).
62 Ga. Res. 2625, supra note 45, at 121-41.
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part,
the territorial integrity of political unity of sovereign and independent States
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a
government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without
distinction as to race, creed or colour.
Id. at 124.
63 World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action, 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993), reprinted in 32
I.L.M. 1661 (1993); see also Scharf, supra note 41, at 382. Note that the Vienna Declaration,
unlike the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations, "did not confine the list of impermissible
distinctions to those based on 'race, creed, or color,' indicating that the distinctions based on
religion, ethnicity, language or other factors would also trigger the right to secede." Scharf,
supra note 41, at 382.
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Involving Minorities,' and the General Recommendation XXI adopted in 1996
by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.65
Most recently, the Canadian Supreme Court dealt with the right to remedial
secession regarding the proposed separation of Quebec from Canada.66
Embracing the Aaland Islands precedent, the Canadian Supreme Court
distinguished the right to internal self-determination from the right to external
self-determination.67 While the former refers to a level of provincial autonomy
within the existing state (Canada in this instance), including political, civic,
cultural, religious, and social rights, the latter refers to the right to separate
from the existing state in order to form a new, independent state.6" The
Canadian Supreme Court, like the League of Nations, held that a people has
* a right to internal self-determination first, and that only if that right is not
respected by the mother-state, the same people's right to break-off may
accrue.69 In other words, the right to separate is conditioned on the non-respect
of the right to some form of provincial autonomy.7"
4 See Comm'm on Human Rights, Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot.
of Minorities, Protection of Minorities: Possible Ways and Means of Facilitating the Peaceful
and Constructive Solution of Problems Involving Minorities, 48, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/34 (Aug. 10, 1993) (prepared by Asbjorn Eide) (stating that the most
extreme claim by minorities in secession by either joining another State or establishing a new
State on part of the State in which they currently live).
65 Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Report of the Comm. on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation XX, 125-26, 11, U.N.
GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 18, U.N. Doc. A/51/18 (Sept. 30, 1996).
6 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.).
67 Id. at 282.
68 Id. (defining internal self-determination as "a people's pursuit of its political, economic,
social and cultural development within the framework ofan existing state," and defining external
self-determination as potentially taking the form of secession, and as arising "in only the most
extreme of cases ... under carefully defined circumstances"). See also Gruda, supra note 4,
at 380-81 (detailing the content of the right to external self-determination and of the right to
internal self-determination).
69 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at 285 ("[W]hen a people is
blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination internally, it is entitled,
as a last resort, to exercise it by secession."). Note that the Canadian Supreme Court declined
to address the issue of under what circumstances such a right to secession accrues, as it
determined that the population of Quebec is entitled to meaningful internal self-determination
and thus not in a position to claim the right to external self-determination. See id. at 295.
70 See id. at 285-86 (noting that when "the ability of a people to exercise its right to self-
determination internally is somehow being totally frustrated," only then does the right to external
self-determination accrue).
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Recent developments in international law may also lend credence to the
idea that the right to remedial secession has crystallized as a norm. As an
example, in 1991, a UN-sanctioned intervention on behalf of the Kurds was
justified on the grounds that the Kurds in northern Iraq were suffering severe
human rights deprivations by the Iraqi government.7' Moreover, in the case of
the former Yugoslavia, the republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and Macedonia were entitled to secede because they had been
denied the proper exercise of their right to democratic self-government, and,
in some cases, had been subject to ethnic violence by the central government
in Belgrade.72
These authorities suggest that if a government is at the high end
of the scale of representative government, the only modes of self-
determination that will be given international backing are those
with minimal destabilizing effect and achieved by consent of all
parties. If a government is extremely unrepresentative and
abusive, then much more potentially destabilizing modes of self-
government, including independence, may be recognized as
legitimate. In the latter case, the secessionist group would be
fully entitled to seek and receive external aid, and third-party
states and organizations would have no duty to refrain from
providing support.73
Once the break-away entity exercises its rights to external self-
determination and declares its independence, it then faces the challenge of
persuading other international actors that it qualifies as a state under
international law. In fact, an entity that has not met this burden risks being
shunned by all relevant international actors. Consequently, such an entity
cannot engage in any meaningful form of international relations.
B. Statehood
Once an entity breaks off from its mother-state and seeks to become
recognized as a new state, the legal question that arises is whether that entity
satisfies the relevant international legal criteria of statehood. According to
7' Scharf, supra note 41, at 383.
72 Id.
71 Id. at 384.
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the 1933 Montevideo Convention, an entity can achieve statehood if it fulfills
four criteria: it has a defined territory, a permanent population, a government,
and the capacity to enter into international relations.74 Moreover, scholars
have elaborated additional criteria for statehood, including independence,
sovereignty, permanence, willingness and ability to observe international law,
a certain degree of civilization, and, in some cases, recognition.75 Statehood
is a legal theory that seeks to justify the attribution of statehood on objective
criteria, which at least in theory are independent from the political reality
underlying many attempts at secession or separation.76
In practice, the theory of statehood has led to anomalous results.77 For
example, as to the first criterion, many entities that we view as states have
impermanent, migratory populations. The Democratic Republic of Congo,
Sudan, and Iraq, to name a few, have all experienced a significant refugee
crisis, resulting in shifts in their respective populations, without thereby losing
their statehood on the international scene.78 Other states have very small
populations, like the Pacific Island state of Nauru (10,000) or the city-state of
San Marino (24,000), and yet, such entities are still treated as states.79 The
second criterion of the Montevideo Convention requires that an entity has a
defined territory. Many entities that we routinely consider states have a
disputed and often undefined territory."0 For example, Israel's territory is
disputed by its Arab neighbors; the two Koreas have battled over their border
for decades; and Somalia and Sudan's territories are disputed by potent rebel
movements. Regarding the third criterion, entities with collapsed governments
have also remained "states" in the past. For example, Afghanistan throughout
the 1990s did not have a stable government, and yet, it remained treated as a
74 Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1993, 49 Stat. 3097, 165
L.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention].
75 See, e.g., JAMESCRAWFORD, THECREATIONOFSTATESININTERNATIONALLAW62-95 (2d
ed. 2006) (discussing independence as a criterion for statehood).
76 See Montevideo Convention, supra note 74, art. 3 (stating that "[tihe political existence
of the state is independent of recognition by the other states").
" DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 39, at 115 (noting the flexible interpretation of the statehood
criteria by "global elites").
78 See Lydia Polgreen, Refugee Crisis Grows as Darfur War Crosses a Border, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 28, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/28/intemational/africa/28border.html; Refugees
International, DR Congo, http://www.refugeesinternational.org/where-we-work/africa/dr-congo
(last visited on Mar. 21, 2009); Refugees International, Iraq, http://www.refugeesinternational.
org/where-we-work/middle-east (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
7' DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 39, at 115.
80 Id. at 115-16.
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state and retained its seat in all major international organizations.8' Finally, as
to the fourth criterion, many entities routinely considered states do not have the
capacity to enter into international relations.8 2 Small nations like Liechtenstein
and Monaco depend on Switzerland and France, respectively, for their national
defense. 3 Several Pacific Island nations, likewise, depend on the United
States and New Zealand for their defense and have been dubbed "freely
associated states."84 Other small nations depend on the United States or other
economically powerful nations for trade and commercial relations.
The above examples demonstrate that the legal theory of statehood remains
inconsistently applied in practice, and that often the geopolitical reality of a
given region dictates whether an entity is treated as a state by the international
community. Thus, statehood in practice seems to hinge on recognition; in
other words, an entity seems to be treated as a state only if the outside world
wishes to recognize it as such.86
C. Recognition
87
There are two theories of recognition under international law: the
declaratory view and the constitutive view.88 Under the former, recognition is
"' Id. at 116.
82 Id.
83 Id.
81 Id (describing the special arrangements that Micronesia, Palau, the Cook Islands, and
Niue-the so-called freely associated states-have with the United States and New Zealand).
85 The so-called "dependency theory" describes this problem as the notion that the
international division of labor between rich core countries and poor periphery countries was the
"primary reason for third-world underdevelopment." Jason Webb Yackee, Conceptual
Difficulties in the Empirical Study of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 405, 412 n.25 (2008).
86 A cynic might ask why international law cares about statehood at all. In other words, why
would a newly independent state care for proving to anyone on the outside that it meets the
requirements of statehood? If the people who live in a given country are happy with the
achievement of independence, they should not have to worry about proving to the outside world
that their home nation qualifies as a state under international law. However, the reality proves
the opposite: a new "state" faces crucial challenges after its assertion of independence, such as
economical and trade issues, developmental problems, security concerns, monetary hurdles, etc.
Thus, an entity seeking to become a state on the international scene must first persuade external
actors that it is a state in order to become fully engaged in international relations with such
external actors on which it often depends.
87 Note that recognition of new states is a totally separate legal issue from the recognition
of new governments. For a discussion of the latter, see DUNOFFET AL., supra note 39, at 157-58.
88 Id. at 137.
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seen as a purely political act having no bearing on the legal elements of
statehood. 9 Under this view, outside states can choose to recognize the new
state, or not, but that decision does not influence the legal determination of
statehood.9" Under the latter, recognition is seen as one of the main elements
of statehood.9 Thus, an entity cannot achieve statehood unless it is recognized
by outside actors as a state.92
While most academics would support the declaratory view,93 the
constitutive view has teeth in practice nonetheless. In fact, one of the four
criteria of statehood-the capacity of the entity seeking to prove statehood to
enter into international relations-seems closely linked to recognition because
an entity claiming to be a state cannot conduct international relations with
other states unless those other states are willing to enter into such relations
with that entity.94 In other words, the conduct of international relations is a
two-way street, involving the new state as well as outside actors that have to
be willing to accept the new "state" as their sovereign partner.95 No state can
exist in a vacuum-a fact well established by international practice. When
Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) decided to separate from Great Britain
and to form an independent state in 1965, most of the world refused to
recognize Southern Rhodesia as a state.96 Consequently, Southern Rhodesia
remained isolated from the world and was unable to conduct international
relations.97 The non-recognition of Southern Rhodesia by outside actors
prevented it from fully exercising the attributes of legal statehood.98 Thus,
89 Id.
90 Id. ("An entity that meets the criteria of statehood immediately enjoys all the rights and
duties of a state regardless of the views of other states.").
91 Id. at 138.
92 Id. ("[Tihe refusal by states to afford recognition would mean that the entity claiming
statehood would not be entitled to the rights of a state.").
93 Id.
9' Id. (arguing that "if states refuse to acknowledge that an entity meets these criteria....
they might continue to treat the claimant as something less than a state." Thus, an unrecognized
state may find that its passports are unacceptable to the immnigration authorities of other states.).
95 Thus, an important treatise states that "[r]ecognition, while declaratory of an existing fact,
is constitutive in nature, at least so far as concerns relations with the recognising state." 1
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 133 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992).
96 DUNOFF ETAL., supra note 39, at 138. Note that the UN Security Council condemned the
Southern Rhodesia declaration of independence and declared that it had no legal validity. S.C.
Res. 217, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/217 (Nov. 20, 1965).
97 DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 39, at 138 (noting that nearly all states refused to conclude
treaties with Southern Rhodesia).
98 Note that the situation was resolved in 1978, following a peace accord which led to a
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recognition, whether considered as a political or legal act, has a direct impact
on the pragmatic determination of statehood: whether an entity will be able to
truly act as a state on the international scene.
In addition to the declaratory and constitutive views, scholars have
advanced a third, intermediary view on recognition. The intermediary view
seeks to combine the declaratory and constitutive views while acknowledging
what truly goes on in practice. It asserts that recognition is a political act
independent of statehood, but outside states have a duty to recognize a new
state if that state objectively satisfies the four criteria of statehood.99
"Recognition, while in principle declaratory, may thus be of great importance
in particular cases. At least where the recognizing government is not acting in
a merely opportunistic way, recognition is important evidence of legal
status.' 100
Finally, another wrinkle to the international theory of recognition was
added in the early 1990s, following the break-up of the former Soviet Union
and the SFRY. At that time, the EU foreign ministers developed guidelines on
the recognition of new states in Europe. The EU foreign ministers, concerned
with the existence and maltreatment of minorities within the former Soviet
Union and the SFRY, announced that one of the criteria of recognition of new
states within the EU would be the respect of human rights, as well as the
protection of minority rights.' Thus, an entity applying for statehood within
the EU had to prove that it treated minority groups fairly and that it respected
minority rights in its territory."°2
While these criteria have not reached the status of international custom and
do not bind states which are not members of the EU, they show nonetheless an
evolution of international law in the field of recognition.° 3 In fact, it seems
majority government in Zimbabwe. Id.
" Id.
100 CRAWFORD, supra note 75, at 93.
See Press Release, European Community, Declaration on the "Guidelines on the
Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union" (Dec. 16, 1991),
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1485, 1486-87 (1992) (requiring "respect for the provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations... especially with regard to the rule of law, democracy and
human rights," and "guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities" in
order for a new state to be recognized).
102 Id.
'03 In fact, the Badinter Commission, an arbitral body of experts operating in the early 1990s
to resolve legal issues arising from the Yugoslav dissolution, added a new criterion for
recognition of new states because "it embraced democratization and respect for human rights"
as such criteria. Hasani, supra note 15, at 307-13.
2009]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
that international law today allows outside actors to impose additional
requirements on entities striving for recognition."° Regional bodies,
organizations, and states can thus choose to require that the entity seeking
recognition comply with specific criteria that have nothing to do with the legal
contours of statehood.
In the context of the EU, such imposition of additional criteria of
recognition was used several times by the Badinter Commission, an arbitral
body of experts established to deal with the various issues arising out of the
Yugoslav crisis in the 1990s. °5 With respect to Macedonia, the Badinter
Commission recommended that Macedonia not be recognized as a new state
unless it agreed to insert a clause in its constitution promising not to claim
additional territory against neighboring states.'06 After Macedonia agreed to
follow the Badinter Commission recommendations, the EU foreign ministers
decided to impose an additional requirement on Macedonia by indicating that
this new state would be recognized only if it used a name which did not
include the term Macedonia.' °7 This "requirement" resulted from a geo-
political grievance by EU-member Greece, which was afraid that the new state
of Macedonia would have territorial claims to a part of northern Greece that
had also been known as Macedonia centuries ago.'0 8 The use of such
additional recognition criteria by the EU signals a regional trend of
conditioning recognition on the respect of fundamental rights and rules of
international law, as well as on obedience with the regional geopolitical
equilibrium. 9 In other words, regional authorities are telling new states that
"0 For example, the EU set out the respect of human rights as a "fundamental prerequisite
for recognition." Brown, supra note 5, at 247.
105 DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 39, at 114-15.
106 R. Badinter, Opinion No. 6 on the Recognition of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia by
the European Community and Its Member States, in Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration
Commission, 31 I.L.M. 1507, 1509 (1992) [hereinafter Badinter Opinion No. 6]. The debate
over Macedonian recognition was sparked by Greek claims that Macedonia would have
territorial claims against northern Greece, a region also known as Macedonia. DUNOFF ET AL.,
supra note 39, at 142.
107 DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 39, at 143. Ultimately, this issue was resolved when
Macedonia was admitted to the UN under the name of "The Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia" pending settlement of the name issue with Greece. Id. The United States
government decided in 2004 to refer to the country as the Republic of Macedonia. Id.
108 Id.
1o' The latter proposition of conditioning recognition on the respect of the regional geo-
political equilibrium is well illustrated by the Greek opposition to the recognition of Macedonia
if the new entity wanted to be called by that name. In fact, nothing in the international legal
doctrine on recognition authorizes states to require new entities to change their name if they wish
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they will only be accepted as full players if they vouch to respect the rule of
law and to adhere to preserving regional stability and peace.
IV. APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO Kosovo
In order to assess the legal validity of the Kosovar declaration of
independence, this Article will examine the three core issues described
above-secession, statehood, and recognition-under international law as it
applies to Kosovo.
A. Secession
The core legal issue relating to the Kosovar declaration of independence is
whether Kosovo has the right to secede from Serbia under international law.
To properly analyze this question, this Article will turn to the right of self-
determination and its contours under modern international law. As stated by
several different precedents, a "people" has a right to so-called external self-
determination only if its rights to internal self-determination are not being
fulfilled by its central government.' 10 In the case of Kosovo, it is certainly true
that Kosovar Albanians are a people: they share a common ethnicity, culture,
language, religion, and social values that distinguish them clearly from the
Serbs.111 Moreover, it is clear that their rights to internal self-determination
had not been respected by the Milogevid-led Serbia. 2 Yet, it is also clear that
to be recognized; yet, in practice, such results are possible and have occurred at least once in
Europe.
... Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 282-83, 287 (Can.) (citing
Declaration on the Principals of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations G.A.
Res. 2625 (XXV), at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970); World Conference on Human
Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 37, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 158/23 (June 12, 1993); Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of
the United Nations, G.A. Res. 50/6, U.N. Doc. A/Res/50/6 (Nov. 9, 2005)); see also Gruda,
supra note 4, at 366 (noting that the right to self-determination belongs to peoples).
1" See supra note 43. As mentioned above, the term people is purposely vague in
international law. One definition views people as "a social group governed by a people that does
not belong to that social group," like the Kosovar Albanians were governed by the Serbs. See
Gruda, supra note 4, at 367. Another way to determine whether a group qualifies as a people
is to use a combination of an objective and a subjective test. See supra Part IIIA.
112 Williams, supra note 13, at 396-97 (noting that from 1989 on, the Kosovar Albanians
"were denied the ability to exercise any sovereign authority or functions or even to participate
in the federal government," and that they were subjected to "a systematic denial of their basic
human rights").
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their rights to internal self-determination were respected in the pre-Milo~evi6
era."13 In other words, the 1974 Constitution of the SFRY specifically granted
autonomous status to Kosovo, and Kosovo thus became a fully functional
province operating in the federal structure of the former Yugoslavia."4
Finally, it is possible that following the NATO intervention in Serbia and the
ousting of the Milogevid regime, the new, more democratically inclined
government of Serbia would respect the Kosovar rights to internal self-
determination. Therefore, while it is certain that the Kosovars' right to internal
self-determination had not been respected by the Milogevid regime, it is true
that those rights had been respected in the past by the SFRY, and it is at least
plausible that those rights would be respected by Serbia in the future.
Ifwe were to conclude that the Kosovar rights to internal self-determination
will be fulfilled in the future, our analysis would stop here because thereunder,
the Kosovars would have no right to external self-determination, like Quebec,
and thus no right to secede from Serbia. On the other hand, if we were to
conclude that it is not likely that Serbia would respect the Kosovar rights to
internal self-determination in the future, then the Kosovars would have the
right to external self-determination and thus the right to secede from Serbia.
Interestingly, although most of the Western world recognized Kosovo as a new
state in the weeks that followed its declaration of independence, none of those
outside recognizing actors invoked the legal theory of secession to justify
Kosovo's separation from Serbia."5 This question will be analyzed in Part
IV.B below.
11 Compare Gruda, supra note 4, at 381 (discussing the general content of the right to
internal self-determination, which includes the right of people to determine their political and
social regime, the right of people to freely dispose of their natural resources and pursue
economic development, and the right to solve all matters under domestic jurisdiction), with
Gruda, supra note 4, at 387 (discussing the rights conferred on the Kosovar Albanians by
the 1974 SFRY Constitution, which included, among other things, the right to adopt laws and
a constitution, and the right to have judicial autonomy and a Supreme Court). Thus, it is clear
that the 1974 SFRY Constitution enabled Kosovo and its citizens to exercise full internal self-
determination.
114 Gruda, supra note 4, at 387.
"' Audio: Panel on International Law, Politics and the Future of Kosovo, held by the
American Society of International Law (Apr. 9-12,2008) [hereinafter ASIL Panel] (on file with
author).
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B. Statehood
If Kosovo claims that it is a new state, independent from Serbia, it has to
prove that it satisfies the four legal criteria of statehood: that it is has a defined
territory, a permanent population, a government, and the capacity to enter into
international relations." 6 All four of these criteria seem difficult to fulfill in
the case of Kosovo.
First, Kosovo's territory is heavily disputed by Serbia, which claims
Kosovo is part of Serbia and historically, Kosovo has always been Serbian
land.' '7 Moreover, Albania has also laid claims to the Kosovar territory in the
past, as the Kosovars are ethnically Albanian and had moved to Kosovo from
Albania centuries ago.' 8 Thus, Kosovo's territory is far from being
undisputed. Second, Kosovo does not have a permanent population because
of the heavy flows of both Serbian and Albanian refugees that move in and out
of Kosovo. "9 Third, Kosovo does have a government, but its stability depends
on protection assured first by the UN, and now by the EU. 20 Without the
international presence and monitoring of this region, the Kosovar government
would be susceptible to attacks by the Serbian minority living in Kosovo as
well as the central Serbian government. Thus, the Kosovar government, absent
116 Montevideo Convention, supra note 74, art. 1.
17 Perritt, supra note 3, at 6 ("Serbs, meanwhile, viewed Kosovo as an historic part of
Serbian land, at least since the ninth century. Today's Kosovo was the heart of 'Old Serbia,'
where the Serbian Orthodox Church, acting through monasteries still standing in Kosovo,
organized Serb and Christian resistance to the spread of Islam under Ottoman domination.").
This was reinforced by the Serbian President Boris Tadic in his emergency address before the
UN Security Council one day after Kosovo declared its independence. See Ban Ki-moon Urges
Restraint by All Sides after Kosovo Declares Independence, supra note 21.
... The Kosovar Albanians claim that they were in Kosovo first, before the Serbs, in the form
of Illyrians, an ethnic group speaking a proto-Albanian language and living in the Roman
province of Dardania. KING & MASON, supra note 14, at 25-26. The Kosovar Albanian desire
to rejoin Albania can be traced back to the late nineteenth century Prizren League, a political
movement that attempted to persuade diplomats meeting at the Congress of Berlin that Albanian-
inhabited territories (including present-day Albania and Kosovo) should be reunited. Id.
at 29-30. Recognizing this historic claim, the present-day international community specifically
requested in the 1998 Public International Law and Policy Group report and in the Goldstone
Commission Proposal II that Kosovo refrain from seeking reunification with Albania. See
Williams, supra note 13, at 417.
19 For example, as ofAugust 1998, the UNHCR estimated that there were 260,000 displaced
people within Kosovo, and another 200,000 outside it. KING & MASON, supra note 14, at 43.
120 Kosovo, since UN Resolution 1244, has been policed by a NATO-led force, KFOR. See
supra note 16 and accompanying text. In the near future, its stability will be assured by EU-led
forces. Alic & Jovanovic, supra note 32.
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international involvement, is unstable at best. Finally, Kosovo can only enter
into international relations because of the international community's
involvement within it. In other words, Kosovo has been administered by the
UN and its internal security has been guarded by international forces, which
ensure that Kosovo has access to the outside world; that it can trade, import,
and export goods; and that its political leaders can travel abroad. 12' Without
this support, Kosovo would not be able to enter into international relations
with any outside actors because its internal borders would be subject to
Serbian interference, and it would likely be blocked off from the outside world
by Serbian forces. Thus, Kosovo's capacity to enter into international
relations seems heavily dependent on the presence of UN and EU forces in this
region.
It is true that arguments regarding Kosovo's fulfillment of statehood criteria
can be made on the other side, and moreover, that many states exist on our
planet which are fully recognized and treated as states, but which do not satisfy
the four objective criteria of statehood.'22 However, most of those entities
were seemingly able to fulfill the criteria of statehood at the time of their
independence and were thwarted by civil war and instability, which in turn
have played a role on their attributes of sovereignty. Kosovo, on the other
hand, seems not to have even satisfied the four criteria of statehood at its birth,
thereby raising questions about the legal validity of its quick ascension into the
realm of statehood.
C. Recognition
Under the declaratory view of recognition--described in Part Ill--outside
actors would be free to recognize or deny recognition of Kosovo, but such
political decisions would not affect Kosovo's legal status as a state.'23 Thus,
the fact that most of the Western world has recognized Kosovo as a state
would have no bearing on the legal question of whether Kosovo has achieved
statehood. Under the constitutive view, however, recognition of Kosovo by
outside actors is one of the elements of its statehood. 4 Under this view, then,
the fact that so many countries have chosen to recognize Kosovo would
121 As mentioned previously, Kosovo has been administered by UNMIK, a UN-led civil
administration, and its borders and stability in general have been assured by KFOR, a NATO-led
force. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
,22 See supra Part III.B.
123 See supra Part III.C.
124 See supra Part II1.C.
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indicate that at least one of the criteria of Kosovar statehood has been fulfilled.
However, Kosovo would still need to prove that it satisfies the four other
criteria of statehood. Under the intermediary view, outside actors would have
a duty to recognize Kosovo as a new state if it fulfilled the four objective
criteria of statehood. 125 However, as discussed above, it is questionable
whether Kosovo fulfills those four criteria and whether outside actors would
thus have a duty to recognize Kosovo.
In practice, how does the Kosovar situation compare to others, where a new
entity with dubious qualities of statehood has sought recognition by outside
actors? Within the context of the former Yugoslavia, many outside actors
quickly recognized Croatia after it declared independence, although its
fulfillment of statehood criteria was dubious at best and its fulfillment of the
Badinter Commission requirement of respect of minority rights was more than
questionable.'26 On the opposite end of the spectrum, EU member states
refused to recognize Macedonia after it declared independence despite the fact
that Macedonia very clearly satisfied the four criteria of statehood 27 and that
the Badinter Commission recommended that Macedonia be recognized as a
new state.'28 Recently, two Georgian break-away provinces, South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, have provoked much international concern over their
"unrecognized" status within the international community. South Ossetia and
Abkhazia have declared independence from Georgia in a de facto manner and
are supported by Russia.'29 The Russian parliament has voted a unanimous
declaration of recognition of these two regions, has provided military support
to them, and has even sent troops into Georgia. 3 ° However, South Ossetia and
125 See supra Part III.C.
126 In fact, the Badinter Commission specifically conditioned the recognition of Croatia on
a reform of its constitution to offer strong protection of minorities. R. Badinter, Opinion No. 5
on the Recognition of the Republic of Croatia by the European Community of the European
Community and Its Member States, in Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, 31
I.L.M. 1503, 1505. Despite this Badinter Commission Opinion, Germany chose to recognize
Croatia as soon as Croatia declared independence. See Carl Cavanagh Hodge, Botching the
Balkans: Germany's Recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, 12 ETHiCS & INT'L AFF. 1 (1998)
(asserting that Germany's unilateral recognition in 1991 of the secessionist states of Slovenia and
Croatia was an act of irresponsible diplomacy).
127 Floudas, Demetrius Andreas, A Name for a Conflict or a Conflict for a Name? An
Analysis of Greece's Dispute with FYROM, J. POL. & MrL. Soc., Winter 1996, available at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/miqa3719/is_19960 1/ain87529 I 0/?tag--content;col 1.
128 Badinter Opinion No. 6, supra note 106, at 1511.
129 Bush Warns Moscow OverBreakaway Autonomy, CNN, Aug. 25, 2008, http://www.cnn.
com/2008/WORLD/europe/08/25/russia.vote/index.html [hereinafter Bush Warns Moscow].
130 Id.
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Abkhazia are not internationally recognized as independent states. 13' Georgia
considers them part of its own territory, and the United States has insisted that
they both remain a part of Georgia.'32 Their status, as of today, remains
uncertain.
These examples indicate that recognition truly is a political act, and that the
geopolitical reality of a given region dictates whether an entity will be
recognized as a new state. 3 This conclusion also seems to indicate that the
recognition of Kosovo was political rather than legal; politically, outside actors
determined that it would be best to accept Kosovo as a new sovereign partner,
but that such actors chose to ignore the dubious legality of the separation. In
fact none of the recognizing nations evoked any legal basis to justify the
Kosovar separation, and no country in the world relied on self-determination
or secession grounds.' This leads us to explore why Kosovo should be a
recognized state, and what the lessons of such recognition there are for the
future.
V. ISSUES SURROUNDING THE KosovAR INDEPENDENCE
Numerous legal and political issues plague the Kosovar independence.
Namely, what legal theories can be offered to justify such independence in the
first place, and what kinds of problems does this troubled region face in its
near future as a new state?
A. Theories to Justify Kosovar Independence
Besides the political willingness to accept Kosovo as a new sovereign state
and the strategic calculus concluding that another state in the Balkans is a
desirable outcome, why should Kosovo qualify as a state? Despite the dubious
legality under positive international law of its separation from Serbia, are there
other evolving theories of independence that would justify the Kosovar break-
off?
35
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 One scholar has noted that "[i]n the past, recognition, or nonrecognition, has been
dependent upon the recognizing state's assessment both of whether the above conditions have
been met de facto, and of whatever political considerations it might also care to consider."
Brown, supra note 5, at 261-62.
134 See ASIL Panel, supra note 115.
131 It should be noted that scholars in the past had advocated various models for Kosovar
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One such theory would focus on so-called "earned sovereignty"-an idea
that a break-away entity does not merit recognition as a new state immediately
after its separation or quest to separate from its mother-state, but that such an
entity needs to earn its sovereignty. 36 Earned sovereignty is a conflict
resolution theory that consists of six elements.'37 The first three core elements
include shared sovereignty, institution building, and final status determination
of the break-away entity, and the latter three elements, which are optional,
include phased sovereignty, conditional sovereignty, and constrained
sovereignty. 3 ' The first core element, shared sovereignty, refers to the shared
exercise of sovereignty by the mother-state and the break-away entity, or
between an international institution and the break-away entity.'39 The second
core element, institution building, refers to the idea that the break-away entity
"undertakes to construct institutions for self-government and to build
institutions capable ,of exercising increas[ed] sovereign authority and
functions."' 40 The third core element, the determination of final status for the
break-away entity, involves either a referendum to determine such final status,
or a negotiated settlement between the mother-state and the break-away entity,
with the help of international mediation.' The first optional element, phased
sovereignty, "entails the accumulation by the sub-state entity of increasing
sovereign authority and functions over a specified period of time prior to the
determination of final status."' 42 The second optional element, conditional
sovereignty, refers to the fact that the break-away entity must meet certain
benchmarks, such as protecting human rights, developing democracy,
respecting the rule of law, and supporting regional stability, before its
autonomy, one of which consisted of granting Kosovo a type of autonomy similar to the status
of Kosovo under the 1974 SFRY Constitution, and the other proposed making Kosovo, in
addition to Serbia and Montenegro, another federal unit within the FRY (prior to the dissolution
of the FRY). See Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, Kosovo Today: Is There No Way Out of the
Deadlock?, 5 EuR. SECURrrY 279, 291-93 (1996); Zoran Lutovac, Options for Solution of the
Problem ofKosovo, 48 REV. INT'L AFF. 1056, 10-12 (1997). Note, however, that no documents
had ever envisioned any substantial autonomy for Kosovo prior to the Rambouillet Accords.
Hasani, supra note 15, at 324.
136 See generally James R. Hooper & Paul R. Williams, Earned Sovereignty: The Political
Dimension, 31 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 355 (2003).
131 Id. at 356.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
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sovereignty may be increased.'43 Finally, the third optional element,
constrained sovereignty, "involves continued limitations on the sovereign
authority and functions of the new state," which may involve international
military and administrative presence and other territorial limitations on the
break-away entity. 44
The general idea of the earned sovereignty approach is that the break-away
entity must demonstrate to the outside world that it is capable of functioning
as an independent state, would be a reliable sovereign partner, and is worthy
of recognition.'45 Moreover, the break-away entity will often need to go
through a transitional stage, during which it is administered by an international
agency, like the UN in the case of Kosovo, which serves as a buffering stage
between full dependence and full independence.'46 This intermediary step of
international administration is often needed because break-away entities tend
to be poor, underdeveloped, and dependent on western aid for economic
survival.'47 Thus, the international administrator helps the break-away entity
develop proper industry, economy, and infrastructure so that it can function as
a viable state once the international administration comes to an end.
48
Kosovo, under this theory, may have earned its sovereignty because it was
administered by the UN, and because during this time, it demonstrated to the
143 Id.
144 Id.
14' For example, Michael Steiner, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to
Kosovo, had proposed a formula called "standards before status," whereby Kosovo would have
to fulfill a number of standards as a prerequisite to international recognition. Gruda, supra
note 4, at 357. According to this proposal, Kosovo would be governed in a system of political
trusteeship in the meantime, in order to advance the local population politically, economically,
socially and educationally. Id. See also Perritt, supra note 3, at 9 (describing the "standards
before status" doctrine).
146 See, e.g., Gruda, supra note 4, at 355 (noting that one of the solutions to the status of
Kosovo would be a "step-by-step" solution whereby Kosovo would be administered by an
international organization first, followed by local elections, a plebiscite, and then the
implementation of whatever status resulted from the plebiscite, the goal being to facilitate a
peaceful separation).
"' Id. at 357 (noting that the intermediary step during which Kosovo would be governed as
a political trusteeship would serve the purpose of advancing the local population politically,
economically, socially, and educationally).
148 See Brown, supra note 5, at 253 (discussing the idea of "an international protectorate
moving towards self-government" in the context of Kosovo, and noting that UNMIK "has made
progress in its stated goals of providing transitional administration, ensuring conditions for a
peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo, and overseeing the development of
democratic provisional institutions of self-government").
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outside world that it was ready and capable of functioning as an independent
state.
49
Another theory of independence that may justify the Kosovar break-off is
that of qualified state sovereignty. 5° Under this theory, state sovereignty does
not enjoy absolute protection in international law and has been eroded through
the forces ofglobalization, which include the notion of interconnectivity across
the planet.'5 ' Thus, under this theory, what a state does within its own territory
affects many other states, so that it can no longer be asserted that a state may
internally do whatever it wishes, as such actions necessarily impact other
states. '52
Translated to Kosovo, what this means is that once Serbia decided to
engage in a repressive campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, this decision
impacted outside actors, who then earned the right to intervene in Serbia on
humanitarian grounds and to decide the future fate of Kosovo. Thus, outside
actors were legally justified in encouraging and providing for the Kosovar
independence because Serbia's claim to territorial sovereignty was not
absolute and remained subject to external influences.' Under this view, it can
also be asserted that Serbia no longer had any valid legal basis to hold onto
9 The Public International Law and Policy Group (PILPG) had advocated the application
of the earned sovereignty conflict resolution tool to the Kosovar crisis as early as 1998.
Williams, supra note 13, at 390.
150 In fact, the earned sovereignty theory also supports this view ofqualified state sovereignty,
as it perceives sovereignty as "a bundle of authority and functions which may at times be shared
by the state and sub-state entities as well as international institutions." See Hooper & Williams,
supra note 136, at 357.
151 See Milena Sterio, The Evolution of International Law, 31 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 213,240 (2008).
152 See id. at 231-32.
151 Several influential authors have supported external intervention in Kosovo on
humanitarian grounds. See Thomas M. Franck, Editorial Comments, NATO's Kosovo
Intervention: Lessons ofKosovo, 93 AM. J. INT'LL. 857 (1999); Antonio Cassese, Ex Iniuria Ius
Oritur: Are We Moving Towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian
Countermeasures in the World Community?, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 23 (1999); Richard A. Falk,
Editorial Comments, NATO's Kosovo Intervention: Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of
International Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 847 (1999); Louis Henkin, Editorial Comments, NA TO's
Kosovo Intervention: Kosovo and the Law of "Humanitarian Intervention," 93 AM. J. INT'L
L. 824 (1999); Ruth Wedgwood, Editorial Comments, NATO's Kosovo Intervention: NATO's
Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 828 (1999). Other authors have supported NATO
actions against the FRY with reservations, arguing that the Kosovo case should not set a
precedent for the future but should be considered an exception due to regional (European)
considerations. See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Editorial Comments, NATO's Kosovo
Intervention: Kosovo's Antinomies, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 860 (1999).
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Kosovo, as its reign of this province became purely symbolic.'54 In other
words, the Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo had diminished to such a
minimum that the notion of territorial sovereignty became trumped by the
necessity of humanitarian intervention or other kinds of outside interference.
Finally, one last theory of Kosovar independence may be that advocated by
the U.S. State Department: that Kosovo is sui generis and that no legal
precedent has been created by its independence.' 55 Under this theory, the
combination of unique circumstances in Kosovojustified its independence, but
such independence creates no new precedent and does not foreshadow the
evolution of any new theories of independence for the future.
Yet, the above theories purporting to justify Kosovar independence are
flawed in one major respect. They start with the premise that Kosovo is
entitled to full independence, and then seek to invent or invoke legal theories
that would justify such independence. In other words, instead of asking what
the Kosovar Albanians' rights are in light of the delicate political situation in
Kosovo, the above theories start by claiming that Kosovar independence is the
solution, and continue by offering legal justifications to support this outcome.
None of the above theories involve discussions of secession, statehood, or
recognition, the fundamental issues of international law that are relevant to all
state separations and break-ups. Moreover, none of the political leaders or
legal scholars who have supported the Kosovar separation have ever discussed
issues of secession, statehood or recognition, or have ever claimed that Kosovo
can be independent because its people have a right to external self-
determination.'56 The above three theories justifying Kosovar independence
certainly bring up interesting issues and present novel views of sovereignty
I
154 See Gruda, supra note 4, at 389-90. This idea of qualified state sovereignty embraces
another principle referred to as the "ethnic principle," which supports Kosovar independence by
the sole fact that Albanians are the dominant ethnic group in Kosovo. Id.
' See Serbia Steps up Anti-Kosovo Pressure, supra note 2. The United States Secretary of
State, Condoleeza Rice, noted immediately after the United States recognized Kosovo as a new
state, that Kosovo was sui generis and thus not precedent-setting for any other minority group
or region in the world. Id. (arguing that the "unusual combination of factors found in the
Kosovo situation-including the context ofYugoslavia's breakup, the history of ethnic cleansing
and crimes against civilians in Kosovo, and the extended period of U.N. administration-are not
found elsewhere and therefore make Kosovo a special case"). John Bellinger, a U.S. Department
of State attorney, also argued that Kosovo was sui generis at the recent American Society of
International Law Annual Meeting in Washington, D.C., in April 2008. ASIL Panel, supra
note 115. In addition, scholars have noted the sui generis nature of the Kosovo issue. See, e.g.,
Gruda, supra note 4, at 353.
156 ASIL Panel, supra note 115.
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under modem international law. However, they seem to circumvent the basics
of international law by avoiding discussion of the most difficult issues thereof
and by offering pragmatic, politically inclined solutions instead. The latter
observation brings us to the next point, which is an evaluation of the political
and legal future of Kosovo as a new state.
B. Lessons for the Future
The near future of the new Kosovar state is precarious at best. The relevant
issues that will puzzle officials and administrations involved in this region
involve Kosovar viability as a state, the looming threat of civil war and
violence against the Serbian minorities, and the precedent that is being set by
Kosovo for other separatist groups around the globe.
1. Viability of Kosovo as a State
Even if Kosovo were to be recognized as a new state by most of the world
community, its long-term viability remains questionable.'57 In other words, if
international administrators were to withdraw from Kosovo now, it would most
likely crumble as a state: it would be unable to militarily defend its borders; to
politically sustain its government; to protect its population; to maintain a sound
economic and commercial policy; or to explore its natural resources.'58 It is
uncertain how long Kosovo will remain dependent on such extensive
international aid, but it is clear that such aid will be necessary in the
foreseeable future.
Thus, it seems that Kosovo is an independent-dependent state-an entity
that is officially recognized as a state but that cannot in reality function as a
state absent strong international support. Is it truly desirable to create such
independent-dependent states?'59 Does this precedent fit into the paradigm of
157 See, e.g., Perritt, supra note 3, at 14-15 (discussing the unstable outlook of Kosovo).
158 A Kosovo that becomes independent though unilateral action would be
challenged to build a sustainable economy, to maintain public order, to extend
its writ into areas now under the practical control of parallel institutions
taking their direction from Belgrade, as in north Mitrovica, and, no doubt, to
protect its borders against military encroachments-all without international
assistance.
Id. at 15.
159 See Ash, supra note 20 (discussing the Kosovar "internationally coordinated declaration
of dependent independence").
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earned sovereignty whereby international dependence is simply a step toward
independent statehood that will ultimately come about, or is this a perfect
model for inciting state failure? An independent-dependent state may never
achieve full independence and may fall apart as soon as the international aid
plug is pulled. The creation of independent-dependent states may be the
perfect recipe for state failure.
2. Threat of Civil War and Threat to Serbian Minorities
Another issue posed by the Kosovar independence is the threat that such
independence poses to the significant Serbian minorities living in Kosovo. 6'
Serbs in Kosovo live either in the south, in Serbian enclaves and villages,
where they are unprotected by international peacekeepers but maintain their
safety by staying within their own communities, or in the north, where they are
protected by UNMIK/KFOR. 6' Nonetheless, Serbs in Kosovo have already
been subject to Albanian attacks during the UN administration of the province,
most notably in March 2004. 62 Such attacks show the volatility of the region
and the difficulty of maintaining peace and stability.'63
Now, after the Kosovar independence, one has to wonder about the fate of
Serbs in Kosovo."6 While Serbs may remain protected during the transitional
160 Note also that the Kosovar independence poses a significant issue regarding the various
Serbian Orthodox monuments and shrines in Kosovo as well. Fred L. Morrison, Between a Rock
and a Hard Place: Sovereignty and International Protection, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 31, 42
(2005).
161 See Perritt, supra note 3, at 14.
162 Id. at 9 (noting that in March 2004, thousands of Kosovar Albanians rioted while
"focusing their rage on Serb 'enclaves' and 'religious symbols' "); see also KING & MASON,
supra note 14, at 9-16 (describing the March 2004 Kosovar Albanian attacks against the
Kosovar Serbs in detail).
163 See, e.g., Perritt, supra note 3, at 9 (indicating that during the March 2004 Albanian riots,
international police proved incapable of stopping the violence and NATO forces "performed
unevenly at best").
"6 One scholar has already noted the mutual mistrust between the ethnic Serbs and Albanians
in Kosovo, and the fact that the Serbian minority would be reluctant to rely on any constitutional
protections in the new Kosovar Constitution for the protection and enforcement of its minority
rights. Morrison, supra note 160, at 43-44. It should also be noted that the Rambouillet
Accords-possibly anticipating problems between the Albanian majority and the Serbian
minority in Kosovo--specifically provided for the protection of human rights in Kosovo: by
incorporating the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, and its Protocols, into Kosovar law; by creating an Ombudsman office to monitor the
protection of minority and human rights in Kosovo; and by specifying rights such as "the use of
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period of independent-dependence, which will entail heavy international
monitoring and peacekeeping, it is uncertain whether they will be able to safely
remain in Kosovo thereafter.'65 Moreover, applying the secessionist logic from
above, one could draw an equally appealing argument that Serbs in the north
of Kosovo should now be able to secede from Kosovo and to rejoin Serbia.'66
After all, it is unclear whether their rights to internal self-determination will
be respected by the independent Kosovar government, and they are ethnically,
socially, culturally, and religiously different from the Albanian majority,
forming a people that may have external self-determination rights. Finally,
even if the Kosovar Serbs remain in Kosovo, it is plausible that a civil war
between the two groups may erupt in the short- or long-term future.'67
3. Precedent for Other Separatist Groups
Although politicians have tried to claim that Kosovar independence is not
precedent-setting and that Kosovo is sui generis,"6s separatist groups
throughout the world were quick to rely on the Kosovar independence to
justify their own secessionist claims.'69 Thus, in the days following the
Kosovar declaration of independence, separatist groups in Moldova and
Georgia cited this "precedent" and reaffirmed their claims for independence.'70
Moreover, pro-Russian separatist provinces in Georgia, South Ossetia and
national community symbols, language, cultural and religious association, and the right to be free
from discrimination." Williams, supra note 13, at 402-03.
165 Scholars have already raised concerns about the treatment ofminorities in an independent
Kosovo. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 5, at 251 n.85 (arguing that minorities have inalienable
rights that must be respected).
166 In fact, Serbs in the north of Kosovo live predominantly in the town of Mitrovica, which
is a "microcosm for all of Kosovo," because its "division and unresolved political status
reinforce its social and economic crisis and fuel ethnic tensions." Perritt, supra note 3, at 26.
Thus, scholars have advocated the partition of Kosovo along the "Mitrovica line," whereby the
northern part of Mitrovica and the territory north of the Ibar River would become part of Serbia,
and the territory south of the lbar River would remain part of the independent state of Kosovo.
Williams, supra note 13, at 405.
167 See Perritt, supra note 3, at 14 (cautioning against outbreaks of violence in Kosovo).
168 See supra note 155.
169 Ash, supra note 20 (noting that leaders in South Ossetia and Transnistria "are muttering
about following the example of the American-backed Kosovans," and that "Basque and Catalan
separatists take note").
170 Kulish & Chivers, supra note 24 (noting that separatist leaders in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, two Georgian provinces, have announced their intention to seek recognition as
independent states, backed by Russia).
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Abkhazia, were looking for ways to lean on the Kosovar independence to
justify their own separation.' 7' Recently, in the aftermath of the Russian
military intervention in Georgia in support of South Ossetia, and Abkhazia
South Ossetia's President, Eduard Kokoity, stated his region had "more
political-legal grounds than Kosovo to have [its] independence recognized.' 72
It is also interesting to note that most countries that have refused to recognize
Kosovo as a new state have important minority groups in their territories and
are afraid of the historical precedent that this separation could spur. 73
Because the Kosovar declaration of independence raises many difficult
legal as well as pragmatic issues, Part VI will now turn to an examination of
other solutions short of independence that could have been envisioned and
implemented in Kosovo.
VI. OTHER SOLUTIONS SHORT OF INDEPENDENCE
Because the Kosovar independence poses significant regional stability
issues and challenges to traditional international law, other solutions to the
Kosovar crisis should have been envisioned by the international community.
Even Albanian scholars have recognized that solutions to the Kosovo issue
other than complete independence exist and have been on the bargaining
table. 174  Some such solutions include the creation of an international
protectorate, conditional independence, and the division of Kosovo along
ethnic lines.'75
First, Kosovo could have remained an international protectorate.
Resolution 1244 effectively placed Kosovo under UN supervision and
authorized civil and security presence.' 76 As conceived in 1999, when the
international protectorate of Kosovo was created, this solution was only
temporary, and the people of Kosovo would be allowed at some point to decide
171 Serbia Steps Up Anti-Kosovo Pressure, supra note 2.
172 Bush Warns Moscow, supra note 129.
171 In fact, scholars have noted that the desire to avoid encouraging secessionist groups
throughout the world from being able to rely on the Kosovo precedent might have driven the
international community to deny Kosovo independence and statehood until now. See, e.g.,
Hasani, supra note 15, at 321 (arguing that the Belgrade regime may have been given
"assurances regarding the unconditional inviolability of Serbia's borders" in the 1990s in light
ofrealpolitik concerns that considered "an international desire to avoid encouraging secessionist
movements in Northern Ireland, Tibet, Chechnya, Quebec, Bosnia, and Macedonia").
"' See Gruda, supra note 4, at 353-59.
175 Id. at 356-58.
176 Id. at 353.
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on the final status.'7 7 However, nothing in the relevant legal documents
surrounding Kosovo and its international protectorate status mandated the end
of such protectorate status in 2008. Moreover, nothing in such legal
documents prevented the creation of another type of protectorate status for
Kosovo, such as a trusteeship or an associated state.7 8 While the continuation
of protectorate status for Kosovo may not be perfect, its downfalls should have
been carefully weighed against the advantages gained by independence.
For example, while it may be true that protectorate status in Kosovo
deterred foreign investment, as investors were reluctant to insert capital into
this region because of such "limbo" status and uncertainty linked to the
Kosovar future,7 9 it can also be argued that more definite and long-lasting
protectorate status for Kosovo would lend itself better to foreign investment.
Investors, knowing that Kosovo would be administered by an international
authority for decades to come, could very well choose to invest in this region,
which would in turn help rebuild the Kosovar economy. Compared to
independence, the protectorate option does not look as grim as had been argued
by some.8 0 In fact, if Kosovo were to remain a protectorate, some of the
problems caused by independence including the lack of economic and military
viability, the threat to the Serbian minorities, and the precedent it sets for other
separatist groups could be avoided.'' By the same token, the creation of a
stable, long-lasting international protectorate could attract foreign investment
to Kosovo and could contribute toward the rebuilding of a sustainable Kosovar
economy and a peaceful multi-ethnic society.
Second, conditional independence "recognizes the right of the people of
Kosov[o] to decide on their future and addresses the legitimate concerns of the
international community regarding the fact that Kosov[o] is still not ready for
177 Id. at 356.
178 See, e.g., Resolution 1244, supra note 16, 1 l(e) (providing for the "political process...
to determine Kosovo's future status," rather than a specific timeline).
... Trebicka, supra note 4, at 255 (noting that Kosovo has a "suspended legal status" and
continues to suffer from "economic, financial, and social uncertainty, which in turn breeds
unemployment and lack of foreign investment").
"' See, e.g., Gruda, supra note 4, at 359-61 (arguing against any protectorate-like options,
while advocating that only three solutions would be possible for Kosovo-independence,
conditional independence, and independence combined with decentralization-because "by
defending the principle of legitimacy and exalting formal retention of Serbian sovereignty over
Kosova, [the international community] den[ies] all of the positive developments in international
law to Kosova, especially the right to self-determination").
1"' See supra Part V.B for a detailed discussion of these problems.
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full independence."'' 12 Conditional independence is one of the elements of the
earned sovereignty theory, s3 and it has been used by the EU, which
conditioned recognition of new states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union on the fulfillment of specific criteria, such as the observation of
minority rights and the recognition of existing borders.'84 Conditional
independence is in fact linked to the above discussed international protectorate
option because it seeks to preserve the status quo (or some variation thereof)
until Kosovo is ready to become a state. Thus, the international protectorate
option and the conditional independence option could be combined, so that
Kosovo would remain an international protectorate as long as it is unable to
fulfill some of the "conditions."
For example, the Kosovar Parliament has promised to respect minority
rights in its February 17, 2008 Declaration of Independence.' 85 However, it is
dubious that such promises can be trusted and will be trusted by the Serbs, in
light of the troublesome interethnic relations in Kosovo. 86 Thus, under the
conditional independence approach, Kosovo would remain a protectorate until
its interethnic relations were resolved. Moreover, although Kosovo has
borders on paper, its northern part remains policed by EU-led forces which
have been ensuring the safety of the Serbian population living in the north. 87
Thus, Kosovo would remain an international protectorate until it could fulfill
the condition of becoming militarily viable on its own. Finally, Kosovo would
remain a protectorate until its economy became viable and sustainable absent
significant international involvement. Conditional independence for Kosovo
recognizes that full independence is premature now but encourages Kosovo to
work toward that goal in the future. Thus, this option avoids the creation of
another dependent-independent state now, while encouraging the entity
seeking to become a state to work toward fulfilling all the criteria needed for
true independence.
82 Gruda, supra note 4, at 357.
133 See supra Part V.A. See generally Williams, supra note 13, at 397-401.
Gruda, supra note 4, at 357.
185 Ash, supra note 20 (arguing that the Kosovar declaration of independence was drafted
with heavy Western influence and direct involvement: "[y]ou can almost hear the western adviser
dictating over the Kosovan draughtsman's shoulder").
186 See generally KING & MASON, supra note 14, at 2-3 (describing "serious hostilities"
between the two groups and nothing "the rift between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo was
deeper than that between any of the other nationalities in Yugoslavia" in the late 1990s).
187 Alic & Jovanovic, supra note 32.
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Finally, the division of Kosovo along ethnic lines is a solution that would
use ethnic criteria to divide Kosovo. 8 In fact, some of the French KFOR
members operating in Kosovo have already suggested that Kosovo be divided
along the Ibar River, so that its north, inhabited mostly by the Serbs, would
revert to Serbia, and most of its south would remain in Kosovo.'89 This
solution takes into account the fact that significant Serbian minorities living
in Kosovo may have a right to self-determination, to the same extent that
Kosovar Albanians had a right to self-determination within Serbia. 9
Moreover, this solution parallels the ethnic principle, which accords the right
to an independent state to ethnic groups.'9 1 This solution also takes into
account the fact that the Kosovar north functions as a de facto separate state
already: it is policed by international forces and has shadow structures
independent of the central Kosovar government.192 Although this solution does
not solve the problem of the Serbian enclaves and villages in the south of
Kosovo, which would remain in Kosovo and not revert to Serbia, it resolves
the problem of the Kosovar north. This solution also provides an option for
the Serbs living in the south of Kosovo to move a relatively short distance to
the Kosovar north, as opposed to forcing them to move much farther north in
Serbia or elsewhere.
The division of Kosovo along ethnic lines simply recognizes that
interethnic relations in this region are too troublesome. Thus, instead of
forcing the ethnic groups to mix and thereby risking civil unrest and
violence,'93 this option envisions new borders that would offer each ethnic
group a representative state.'94 The division of Kosovo along ethnic lines
rejects idealistic notions of a multiethnic society and accepts a more realistic
vision of Kosovo as an already divided society.
The above three solutions for Kosovo: the creation of a protectorate,
conditional independence, and the division along ethnic lines, represent
alternatives to independence. This Article argues that such alternatives may
188 Gruda, supra note 4, at 358.
189 See KING & MASON, supra note 14, at 18
190 See supra Part V.B.
... Gruda, supra note 4, at 366, 389-90.
192 Alic & Jovanovic, supra note 32.
'93 Scholars have already noted that "Kosovo's demographics point towards... mono-
ethnicity," and that once the present generation in Kosovo dies, "the ghost of multi-ethnicity will
go with them." KING & MASON, supra note 14, at 263.
194 See Gruda, supra note 4, at 357-58.
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avoid many of the problems caused by the sudden Kosovar independence
while offering just and durable solutions for this volatile region.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Kosovar declaration of independence represents a fascinating case in
international law. It poses important questions regarding the modem day
understanding of the international legal theories of secession, statehood, and
recognition. Moreover, it challenges scholars to assert new theories as
justification for such unilateral separation of an entity from its mother-state.
It raises issues about the future of this troubled region, as many wonder about
its long-term viability and true independence from Western military and
economic support. Finally, it poses concerns over its precedent-setting
secessionist ideology. In light of these challenging issues and questions, other
solutions to the Kosovar problem, such as the creation of an international
protectorate, conditional independence, and the division along ethnic lines
should have been envisioned and seriously considered before full
independence of Kosovo was embraced by the West.
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